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Sophisticated Voting on Competing Ballot Measures: Spatial Theory and Evidence
David Hugh-Jones
Are voters sophisticated? Rational choice theories of voting assume that they are. Students of  
voting behaviour are more doubtful. I examine voting in a particularly demanding setting: 
direct democratic elections in which two competing proposals are on the ballot. I develop a 
spatial model of voting and proposal qualification with competing proposals. If voters are 
naïve, then competing proposals can be used to block the direct democratic route to change.  
But if voters vote strategically, competing proposals can bring outcomes closer to the median 
voter. Examining voting intention data from California polls, I find evidence that some votes 
are cast strategically even in these demanding circumstances. However, the level of strategic  
voting appears to be affected by the tenor of the election campaign.
31 Introduction
Direct democratic systems face a problem not found in pure representative democracies: what 
should the outcome be when voters simultaneously approve two or more contradictory 
measures? In many systems, the measure with most votes wins out. This rule offers any ballot 
proposal’s opponents a powerful tactic: to qualify a "counter-proposal" on the same subject 
and draw support away from the original proposal, or split the electorate so that both 
proposals fail. For example, California's famous Proposition 13, which kick-started the latest 
wave of initiative usage in 1978, faced the more moderate Proposition 8, sponsored by the 
state legislature; in 1988 Proposition 103 on auto insurance reform faced four different 
competitors; and Proposition 79, to provide prescription drugs for poorer Californians, 
competed with the industry-sponsored Proposition 78 in November 2005. These are some of 
the highest-profile and most expensive initiative campaigns in recent years: counter-proposals 
are an important part of California’s direct democratic landscape, adding to an arsenal of tools 
that opponents of a direct democratic measure can use to prevent its being passed and 
implemented.1
When a pair of competing proposals are on the ballot, the voter faces a difficult choice. Even 
if she knows the content of each proposal, she must decide whether to vote for one, none or 
both. Suppose that the voter prefers both proposals to the status quo, but most prefers the 
original proposal. Voting for only the original proposal may help it to beat the counter-
proposal. But there is the risk that both proposals may fail. On the other hand, voting for both 
1  See especially Elisabeth Gerber, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, and D. Roderick 
Kiewiet, Stealing the Initiative: How State Government Responds to Direct Democracy 
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall 2000).
4proposals increases the chance that the counter-proposal will pass, but also increases the 
chance that it will beat the original proposal. The optimal way to vote depends on the 
probabilities of being pivotal between the original proposal and the status quo, between the 
counter-proposal and the status quo, and between the two proposals. So, it depends on how 
others plan to vote.
The voting behaviour literature raises the question of whether voters will be able to achieve 
this level of sophistication. First of all, how will rationally ignorant voters find out the content 
of proposals? If they achieve this, how will they coordinate with other voters to make an 
optimal choice? To these challenges to voter competence, optimists may reply that cues and 
heuristics will help voters make the right decision without having to think too hard.2 If this 
account is correct, competing direct democratic proposals create a particularly demanding 
choice situation for voters. Direct democratic votes are often not very salient, so voters may 
pay them little attention and rely more than usual on heuristic rather than systematic 
information processing. Strategic voting on competing proposals may require voters to vote 
yes on both of two apparently opposed measures, which arguably requires more political 
knowledge and sophistication than the relatively simple task of voting for one’s most 
preferred of the top two candidates in a multi-candidate election. The key heuristic of party 
identification is often unavailable in ballot initiative votes, because they may be proposed by 
any individual or group. (Party identification may be useful if proposals have been referred to 
the people by the legislature.) Worse, even if the ideology of the proposer is known to voters, 
in the case of competing proposals this cannot be mapped to the content of the proposal. A 
simple example will show why. First consider a voter with ideal point V facing a status quo 
2  Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Phillip E. Tetlock, Reasoning and Choice,  
Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991); 
Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential  
Campaigns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991).
5SQ and an original proposal P1, proposed by an interest group whose ideal point G is known 
to him. In this situation, the voter can at least infer which side of the status quo the proposal 
is. G will never propose P1 on the opposite side to SQ from G: this could only make the group 
worse off. See Figure 1.
(Figure 1 about here.)
Now consider a pair of competing proposals, shown in Figure 2. Suppose that the voter 
already knows the location of P1. A conservative group C, on the opposite side of the status 
quo from the voter and the proposal, puts a counter-proposal on the ballot. It would like to 
propose and pass its own ideal point, but this may not be feasible. Instead it may have to 
propose a compromise P2 which is worse for it than the status quo, but better than P1. Now the 
link between the conservative group’s ideal point C, and its proposal location P2, is broken: 
they may indeed be on opposite sides of the status quo.
(Figure 2 about here.)
For all these reasons, competing direct democratic proposals offer a hard test for theories of 
strategic voting. This paper has two components. In the theoretical component, I show the 
serious consequences if voters fail that test. For, even under the optimistic “complete 
information” assumption that voters have precise knowledge of the content of proposals, if 
voters are naïve, counter-proposals can be used to block all possibility of policy change via 
the direct democratic route. On the other hand, if voting is strategic, counter-proposals can 
actually benefit direct democracy by making the agenda-setting process more competitive.
My empirical tests then examine four sets of competing proposals in California. Using data 
6from opinion polls close to the election, I find evidence for strategic voting in some elections. 
I hypothesize that voters’ strategies are indeed influenced by cues from elites: when 
campaigns are highly polarized, strategic voting is less likely. Nevertheless, if enough voters 
can achieve sophisticated voting behaviour, the direct democratic process will not be blocked 
by counter-proposals.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes counter-proposals in more 
detail, and briefly reviews the literature on counter-initiatives and voter sophistication. In 
section 3 I develop a spatial model of counter-proposals, which treats interest groups as 
rational but allows various assumptions about voter behaviour. (The appendix contains formal 
proofs.) I find that if “naïve” voters support only their most preferred option, a counter-
proposal can split the voters and ensure that both proposals fail. But if voters are rational, the 
threat of the counter-proposal brings outcomes closer to the median voter. In section 4 these 
competing predictions are tested with polling data from California. The results show that at 
least some voters are sophisticated. However, the level of sophisticated behaviour varies 
between elections. Section 5 examines what drives this variation. Finally, I draw theoretical 
and practical conclusions.
2 Counter-proposals in the literature
As stated above, in a direct democracy voters may vote simultaneously for measures with 
conflicting provisions. There are different ways to resolve or prevent this. In Switzerland, 
when a popular initiative faces a counter-proposition from the legislature, votes are taken on 
both, and if both pass, only the one with most votes is implemented. Until 1987 voters could 
only vote yes on one out of the two proposals: support would often be split so that both failed. 
Since 1987 voters have been able to vote yes on both propositions and to choose one as their 
7first preference if both pass. In the US, Washington State allows the legislature to offer an 
alternative to an initiative. Voters choose first whether they would prefer either of the two to 
the status quo, then choose one of the two measures; if a majority votes for change, then the 
most popular proposal passes.
Thirteen US states explicitly use the system explored in this paper.3 Their constitutions lay 
down that if the provisions of two simultaneously passed ballot proposals conflict, those of 
the proposal with more votes will take effect. This rule does not completely specify the 
system. The courts or constitution must also rule on what count as conflicting provisions. 
Narrow or broad interpretations of conflict are possible. As an example of the latter, the 
California Supreme Court has ruled that when proposals lay out different “comprehensive” 
schemes of regulation on the same topic, the proposals conflict.4 Some ballot proposals 
include specific language invalidating other measures on the same issue if those measures 
pass with fewer votes. 
There is a small literature specifically on counter-proposals. Dubin, Kiewiet and Noussair 
develop a choice model for counter-proposals: rather than a full Nash equilibrium, they model 
3 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Massachussetts, Michigan, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Utah. Mississippi uses this system unless the 
counter-initiative is sponsored by the legislature, in which case the Washington State system 
is used. Oklahoma uses this system but specifies that if both measures fail but one gets more 
than a third of votes cast, it is voted on alone at the next election. See the list of state 
constitutions at http://www.iandrinstitute.org, downloaded December 2005.
4 Supreme Court of California, Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political  
Practices. Commission, 51 Cal.3d 744 . [No. S012016. Supreme Court of California. Nov 1, 
1990.]
8a “first-order strategy” for groups of voters who assume that other groups will vote sincerely5. 
They find evidence for strategic voting by showing that aggregate support for a more 
moderate proposition sometimes decreases as support for change increases, because 
extremists prefer to avoid a compromise.  Banducci provides the most comprehensive 
examination to date.6 As well as examining the effect of competing proposals on voter 
information, she examines voter choice over counter-proposals, and sees voting yes on both 
proposals as normally irrational. However, I show below that rational voters may vote “yes on 
both” in equilibrium. Banducci provides important evidence about voter behaviour in the 
presence of counter-proposals. Reversals of majority opinion during the campaign are more 
likely for competing sets of proposals, than for initiatives which face no counter-proposal; 
initiatives which face a counter-proposal are more expensive and more likely to fail. The 
influence of ideology on voting is strong for original initiatives but weaker for counter-
proposals, a finding supported by Bowler and Donovan in their examination of California's 
competing propositions 131 and 1407. Banducci explains this by suggesting that counter-
proposals are the subject of mixed messages from elites, who only support them in order to 
defeat the original initiative, and thus confuse voters. It might alternatively be that counter-
proposals get most support from the centre ground, so that the link between ideology and 
support is non-linear.
Counter-proposals get a similarly bad press in more general work. Dubois and Feeney, 
writing shortly after the 1990 California election, worry about the number of competing 
5 Jeffery A. Dubin, Roderick D. Kiewiet and Charles N. Noussair, “Voting on Growth Control 
Measures”. Economics and Politics 4 (1992), 191-213
6 Susan Banducci. “Counter-propositions”, unpublished PhD dissertation (University of 
California, Santa Barbara 1995)
7 Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan, Demanding Choices: Opinion, Voting and Direct  
Democracy  (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1998)
9proposals on the ballot, and recommend preventing proposals from changing the rules 
governing their own effect (as many counter-proposals do by including measures to override 
competing proposals).8 The California Commission on Campaign Finance Reform sees 
counter-proposals as “a tactic to confuse voters”.9 Donovan, Bowler, McCuan and Fernandez 
categorize them as a tactic used by “narrow” interest groups competing against one another.10 
Magleby sees counter-proposals as designed to confuse and fatigue voters, but also as 
compromises which move “part way towards the objective of the original initiative”.11 On the 
other hand, some of the same authors recommend counter-proposals from the legislature as a 
way to moderate direct democracy's excesses. 12 This paper moderates the negative view of 
counter-proposals, by offering a more nuanced theory. When voters are naïve, counter-
proposals do indeed split the electorate and frustrate the democratic will. If (some) voters can 
8 Philip L. Dubois and Floyd Feeney, “Improving the California Initiative Process: Options 
for Change.” (Berkeley: California Policy Seminar 1991)
9 California Commission on Campaign Finance Reform, Democracy by Initiative: Shaping 
California's Fourth Branch of Government. (Los Angeles: Center for Responsive 
Government  1992)
10 Todd Donovan, Shaun Bowler, David McCuan and Kenneth Fernandez, “Contending 
players and strategies: Opposition advantages in initiative elections” in Shaun Bowler, Todd 
Donovan and Caroline Tolbert, eds., Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United 
States (Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1998)
11 David Magleby, “Direct Legislation in the American States” in David Butler and Austin 
Ranney, eds., Referendums around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy. 
(London: Macmillan 1994)
12 e.g. Dubois and Floyd Feeney, “Improving the California Initiative Process”; California 
Commission on Campaign Finance Reform, Democracy by Initiative; also Richard Ellis, 
Democratic Delusions (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 2002).
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make sophisticated voting choices, however, counter-initiatives can actually bring outcomes 
closer to the median voter.
To understand which of these outcomes occurs, therefore, we need to understand how voters 
actually make their minds up in these elections. Perhaps the best-known contribution to the 
literature on voting behaviour in this context is Lupia’s claim that ignorant voters can use the 
support or opposition of known individuals or groups for a ballot proposition, to determine 
whether they should support it themselves, thus overcoming the lack of cues from 
partisanship or retrospective evaluation.13 Although Lupia’s study examined voting on five 
competing insurance initiatives, his theory did not examine the strategic choice situation 
directly, instead focusing simply on whether less knowledgeable voters could emulate more 
knowledgeable ones. However, scholars within the voting behaviour tradition have sought 
heuristics that enable strategic voting more generally. Duch and Palmer suggest that 
charismatic major party leaders can act as a coordination device for strategic voting, while 
Forsythe et al. suggest that electoral history can do the same, a claim supported by 
Gschwend’s analysis of German elections.14 Neither history nor party leaders are available in 
13 Arthur Lupia, “Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in 
California Insurance Reform Elections.” American Political Science Review 88:1 (1994), 
63-76
14 Raymond M. Duch and Harvey D. Palmer, “Strategic Voting in Post-Communist 
Democracy?” British Journal of Political Science 32 (2002), 63-91; Robert Forsythe, Roger 
B. Myerson, Thomas A. Rietz and Robert J. Weber, “An experiment on coordination in multi-
candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories.” Social Choice and 
Welfare 10:3 (1993) 223-247; Thomas Gschwend 
“Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from Germany”,
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direct democratic votes. This raises the question: can voters vote sophisticatedly on ballot 
proposals? The current article shows that at least some of them can. It also suggests that 
campaigns themselves can provide cues on how to vote, and the nature of these cues can 
explain when the electorate as a whole succeeds and fails to vote sophisticatedly.
When competing propositions are on the ballot, a voter may want one proposition to pass if 
the other fails, but to fail if the other passes. In other words, counter-propositions induce non-
separability in voter preferences over ballot results, even when preferences on the underlying 
policy dimension are separable. Lacy and Niou show that naïve voting with non-separable 
preferences can lead to universally disliked outcomes, and/or manipulation by an agenda-
setter.15 I confirm this result in a specific setting, but disagree with their resulting pessimism 
about direct democracy. Voting behaviour in elections need not be naïve: instead, the voting 
strategies adopted may depend on cues from political elites.
3 The formal model
Our model is as follows. The status quo is SQ. An interest group G puts proposition P1 on the 
ballot. We treat the alternatives SQ and P1  as points on a line, and assume that voters know 
what the alternatives are, have an ideal policy point on the line, and prefer outcomes closer to 
that point (utility functions are symmetric and single-peaked over the real line). The interest 
group wants policy to be as high as possible. If counter-proposals are not possible, the highest 
European Journal of Political Research 46:1 (2007), 1–23.
15 Dean Lacy and Emerson M. S. Niou. “A Problem With Referendums”, Journal of  
Theoretical Politics (2000) 12(1), 5-32
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policy they can achieve is determined by the median voter, whose ideal point is MV. Let MV' 
be the point as far away from MV on the right as SQ is on the left: the median voter is 
indifferent between MV' and SQ. If P1 is to the right of MV', the median voter and the half of 
the electorate to her left will prefer SQ. So the highest proposal that will pass is located at 
MV'. The interest group sponsors P1=MV', and this is the outcome.16 
To examine the effect of counter-proposals, we introduce a second, “conservative” interest 
group C, who may sponsor a counter-proposal P2. See again figure 1. The conservative group 
wants policy to be as far to the left as possible. (This is a simplification. All that is required is 
for C’s ideal point to be to the left of Q and G’s ideal point to be the right of MV’. Thus, 
counter-proposals from the legislature fit this pattern, if we can presume its ideal point to be 
at Q.) The conservative group decides whether to sponsor after learning G's decision. This fits 
the pattern of past counter-proposal campaigns. Both propositions are the same side of the 
status quo as the median voter. (Proposals on the other side of the status quo from the median 
voter would never pass, and so could not threaten a proposal that might pass.) Election returns 
translate into outcomes as follows, where Y* indicates the proposition receiving more votes:
P1 P2 Outcome
Y* Y P1
Y N P1
Y Y* P2
N Y P2
N N SQ
16 This is the “setter model”: see Thomas Romer and H. Rosenthal, “Bureaucrats Versus 
Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (1979) 93:563-587.
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I examine two models. In the first, voters are naïve: they vote only for the outcome they most 
prefer. In the second, voters are sophisticated and vote to maximize their utility.  (Voters in 
both models are sincere, by Brams' definition that a sincere voter who votes for option X must 
also vote for all options she strictly prefers to X.17) An alternative model of naïve voting 
would assume that voters vote for any proposal they prefer to the status quo. Under this 
assumption, a P2 placed just to the right of the status quo is guaranteed to beat P1:, as it will be 
supported by a superset of the supporters of P1 and so will pass with more votes. Thus the 
direct democratic route to substantive change is blocked18. This model does not resemble 
reality: empirically, as we shall see, double-yes voting is rare. 
Naïve voters
If voters only vote for their preferred proposition, then change will be limited by the costs of 
the conservative group. The intuition is straightforward. So long as some voters prefer the 
staus quo to any change towards the median voter, the remaining voters can be split into two 
equal sized groups by an appropriately placed counter-proposal. As these groups each 
comprise less than half the electorate, both proposal and counter-proposal fail. The situation is 
shown in Figure 3. 
(Figure 3 about here.)
Proposition 1: if voters are naïve, no change from the status quo occurs when counter-
proposals are possible.
17 Steven Brams, “Strategic Information and Voting Behavior”, Society (1982) 19:4-11
18 A formal proof is available on request.
14
Proof: see the Appendix.
In short, if voters are naïve, counter-proposals frustrate substantive reform. If we assume that 
voters randomize between proposals that are located at the same point, then the conservative 
group can block change simply by placing P2=P1. Even if voters coordinate when faced with 
two identical proposals, any change can be blocked, although this might involve a counter-
proposal to the right of the original proposal. 
Sophisticated voters
Possible preference schedules, over real world outcomes and election returns, are as follows, 
where  means “strict preference” and ~ means “indifference”. We give voters with each 
preference schedule an arbitrary but convenient label. For example, “conservatives” rank the 
status quo SQ above P2 and P2 above P1; therefore they most prefer No on both proposals 
(NN), followed by either Yes on the counter only (NY), or Yes on both with the counter 
gaining more votes (YY*), both of which mean that P2 is the outcome; their least preferred 
options are the two outcomes YN and Y*Y which lead to P1.
Label Outcome preferences Ballot preferences
“conservatives” SQ  P2   P1 NN  NY ~ YY*   YN ~ Y*Y
“moderates” P2  SQ   P1 NY ~ YY*  NN  YN ~ Y*Y
“progressives” P2  P1  SQ NY ~ YY*  YN ~ Y*Y   NN
“radicals” P1  P2  SQ YN ~ Y*Y  NY ~ YY*   NN
Other schedules are ruled out by single-peakedness.  Voting is straightforward19 only for 
19 In the sense of Robin Farquharson, Theory of Voting. (New Haven: Yale University Press 
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moderates, who want P2 to pass and P1 to fail in all circumstances. Other voters' preferences 
are non-separable: for example, conservatives will want P2 to beat P1 if they expect a yes on 
P1, but will want P2 to fail if P1 does so too. Figure 4 shows the intervals containing the ideal 
points of the four voter blocs.
(Figure 4 about here.)
I assume that voters in each of the four blocs coordinate as if they made up a single unitary 
actor. The idea behind this is that voters in each bloc take cues on how to vote from elites 
who share their preferences. For example, voters may take advice from newspapers, which 
regularly run editorials recommending a Yes or No vote on a particular proposals, or from 
bodies like the National Organization of Women or Americans for Democratic Action, which 
produce voter guides to the proposals on the ballot, or from elected politicians who come out 
for or against a particular proposal. Assuming that voters are individually rational would 
complicate the analysis without leading to substantially different results.20
The sophisticated voting game has multiple equilibria and is less intuitive than naive voting. 
However, its results are more optimistic. Voter sophistication prevents the conservative 
interest group from splitting the electorate. At the same time, the interest group G is 
constrained to propose P1 closer to the median voter by the threat of a counter-proposal. 
Proposition 2: when voters are sophisticated and counter-proposals are possible, the 
outcome of a direct democratic campaign will be strictly closer to the median voter’s ideal  
1969)
20  A model of individually rational voting demonstrating this is available from the author on 
request.
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point than the status quo.
Proof: see the Appendix. 
The argument is best illustrated with a pair of examples. First, suppose that the original 
interest group proposes P1=MV. Then, any counter-proposal to the left of P1 will fail, as 
radicals – those who prefer P1 to both P2 and the status quo – form a majority, and can 
achieve their most favoured outcome by voting YN. On the other hand, suppose that P1=MV’ 
so that the median voter is indifferent between the proposal and the status quo. Then consider 
a counterproposal P2=MV. Now, the conservative, moderate and progressive groups prefer P2 
to P1 , and these are a majority of the voters. There is then a voting equilibrium in which all 
three groups vote NY and P2 passes, beating P1. Neither of these examples show equilibrium 
behaviour by the interest groups: in equilibrium, the original interest group proposes P1 to the 
right of the median voter, but not so far as to generate a successful counter-proposal.
If votes are cast sophisticatedly, then the threat of counter-proposals does not block 
substantive change by the initiative process. Instead, initiatives are moderated towards the 
median voter. 
4 Empirical tests
My models generate predictions about counter-proposal outcomes. Strictly, both models 
predict no counter-proposals in equilibrium. This unrealistic prediction is driven by the 
assumption of complete information. If we allow that interest groups may be mistaken about 
voter opinion, then some counter-proposals will occur. The naïve model then says that the 
counter-proposal can usually be written to cause both competing proposals to fail. The 
17
sophisticated model says that the counter-proposal will not make both proposals fail (unless 
both interest groups have completely misestimated the voters’ preferences) but will normally 
pass with more votes, or pass while the original proposal fails. Table 2 collates the results of 
all pairs of competing proposals in California since the introduction of the initiative. 
(Table 2 about here.)
Clearly, neither naïve voting nor sophisticated voting explains all the results. Although the 
modal outcome is that both competing initiatives failed (as naïve voting would predict), more 
than half of the cases show one or other initiative succeeding. In addition, there are three 
cases in which both initiatives got a majority of the vote. This clearly could not happen unless 
at least some voters were voting yes on both initiatives. So there is some prima facie evidence 
of sophisticated voting from the macro-level data. On the other hand, perhaps voter 
ignorance, rather than sophistication, explains YY voting: maybe YY voters simply did not 
realise that the relevant ballot measures were in conflict, or did not understand the 
consequences if both passed. There may also have been competing proposals which do not fit 
our model – for example, if rival proposals for change are put forward by two groups who 
favour different degrees of reform, or groups with different preferences in a multidimensional 
issue space. One important issue is that the court decision giving a broad interpretation to 
“competing” proposals was given in 1990. Arguably, before the ruling, the legal situation was 
unclear and voters may have been uncertain about the outcome if both proposals passed. 
However, as stated, some initiatives contained language explicitly invalidating their rivals 
wholesale if they passed with more votes (examples include Proposition 1a in 1968 and 
Proposition 104 in 1988).
To detect sophisticated voting, I therefore examine individual voting intention data in a subset 
of proposal pairs which clearly match the model conditions. The sophisticated model allows 
18
multiple equilibria. For testing, we assume that when a group could vote in different ways 
without affecting the outcome, members of the group will vote in any undominated way, as 
there is no payoff to effort spent on coordination. Predicted voting patterns from the voting 
game are shown in Table 3.
(Table 3 about here.)
Sophisticated models predict YY voting by groups of voters defined by the underlying policy 
dimension: either a group of voters in the middle of the policy spectrum, or all voters to the 
right of some cutpoint. The naïve model predicts no YY voting. However, if some voters are 
unaware that proposals are competing, then of this uninformed group, more extreme voters 
will vote YY. Thus, on this slight extension to the naïve theory, YY votes should be found 
among more extreme and less informed voters. On the sophisticated theory, voters’ levels of 
information should not be relevant; in some equilibria, more extreme voters vote YY, while in 
others, moderate voters vote YY. To sum up: if YY voters are more moderate than YN 
voters , then this is evidence against naïve voting. If YY voters are less informed than YN 
voters, this is evidence against sophisticated voting. If YY voters are more extreme than YN 
voters, this is compatible with either theory.
I select contests in which (1) voters are likely to have known the consequences of both 
initiatives passing – thus, contests after the 1990 court decision, or in which one or more 
proposal contained explicit language invalidating its rivals; (2) the contest clearly fits the 
model of one proposal’s supporters aiming for policy change while the other group would 
ideally prefer no change at all; and (3) we have reasonably adequate data on underlying policy 
preferences. The chosen contests are listed below in Table 4.
(Table 4 about here.)
19
In 1988, Proposition 104 contained language invalidating other propositions on auto 
insurance if they passed with fewer votes (including Proposition 103). In the 1990 general 
election, a VRS exit poll with a large sample size allows us to find significant predictors of 
voting behaviour on two rival initiatives relating to term limits. In 1996, the Field poll asked 
respondents’ opinions of Ralph Nader, backer of Proposition 216, and about support for 
government intervention more generally. In 2005, only demographics are available. 
For all the regressions I used demographics as independent variables, including ethnicity, 
gender, income, education, religion and age, and where possible employment, unionization, 
home ownership and marital status. Each of these demographics has been found to predict 
votes in some, though not all, initiative elections.21 I also always included party allegiance and 
liberal-conservative ideology, which are known to be good predictors of ballot measure 
voting.22 Where possible, I also included measures for support for change on the proposals’ 
topic. In 1988, I included support for two other ballot measures that were likely to be linked 
to support for government intervention: a proposal to establish a fund for homelessness and to 
restore funding for Cal-OSHA, the state’s occupational safety and health plan. In the 1990 
general election, I expected religious attendance, Protestantism, and concern over political 
21 Regina P. Branton, “Examining Individual-Level Voting Behavior on State Ballot 
Propositions”, Political Research Quarterly 2003, 56(3):367-377; Zoltan L. Hajnal, Elisabeth 
R. Gerber and Hugh Louch, “Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California 
Ballot Proposition Elections”, Journal of Politics 2002, 64(1):154-177; Shaun Bowler and 
Todd Donovan, op. cit.
22  Daniel A. Smith and Caroline J. Tolbert, “The Initiative to Party: Partisanship and Ballot 
Initiatives in California”, Party Politics Quarterly 2001, 7(6):739-757; Regina P. Branton, 
op. cit.; Susan Banducci, “Searching for ideological consistency in direct legislation 
voting”, in Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Caroline Tolbert, op. cit.
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ethics (measured by belief that ethics mattered in the choice of state governor) to be 
predictors, as well as residence in a state seat which was uncontested, and in an uncontested 
seat occupied by someone of the “opposite” party to the respondent. I expected support for 
Pete Wilson, who had come out in favour of term limits, to predict support for change; 
similarly, as President Bush had supported term limits, I expected this to be relevant. In 1996, 
approval of Ralph Nader was expected to predict support for the original Proposition 216, 
sponsored by him; I also expected general support for government intervention to predict 
support for Proposition 216, as the proposition increased regulation of healthcare providers 
and imposed extra taxes.
Results
To explore whether YY voting can be predicted by underlying preference, I first run a set of 
logit regressions on the vote on the original proposal. 23 Theories of naïve and sophisticated 
voting agree that voters to the right of some cutpoint vote Yes. The independent variables, 
multiplied by their estimated slopes, are the best linear predictor of the logged odds of a Yes 
vote, and thus provide a rough measure of underlying preference. I then plot voting patterns 
against this predicted probability. Both theories predict that NY voting should be related to 
ideology, usually in a non-linear way: conservatives vote NN and radicals vote Y on the first 
initiative, while those in the middle are more likely to vote NY. Both theories also predict that 
YY voting should be related to ideology: naïve voting predicts a positive relationship as 
uninformed extremists vote YY instead of YN; sophisticated voting predicts either a positive 
relationship or a non-linear relationship in which relatively centrist voters choose YY while 
extremists choose YN. Figure 5-Figure 7 divide voters into quintiles by their predicted 
probability of a Yes vote on the original proposition, and show the actual voting patterns in 
23  Full results of these regressions are available from the author on request.
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each quintile.
(Figure 5-Figure 7 about here.)
The pictures show a clear relationship between YY voting and predicted probability of voting 
yes on the original proposal – unsurprisingly, as YY voters helped generate the predicted 
probabilities in the original regression. More interestingly, in the case of Propositions 131 and 
140, the ratio of YN to YY voting increases with the predicted probability. That is, among 
Yes voters on the original proposal, those with higher predicted probabilities of voting Yes on 
the original, were more likely to vote No on the counter-proposal. This is what would happen 
in a sophisticated equilibrium where more moderate voters were voting YY while more 
extreme voters chose YN. The same is true for Propositions 78 and 79 in 2005. In 1996, 
however, the reverse holds: more extreme voters are relatively more likely to choose YY than 
YN. The pattern in 1998 for Propositions 103 and 104 is less clear. It seems that in some 
cases at least, moderates are voting YY as the sophisticated voting theory would predict.
For a more formal test, I run a second round of logistic regressions, this time including only 
voters who voted Yes on the original proposal. The dependent variable is vote on the counter-
proposal: in other words, we are comparing YY voters to YN voters. As an independent 
variable, I include the predicted logged odds of voting Yes on the original proposal. This, 
again, gives a rough measure of underlying ideological position. I also include variables 
measuring the voter’s levels of information about the proposals and interest in them. Naïve 
voting predicts that ideological position should be positively related to voting Yes on the 
counter-proposal, and negatively related to levels of interest and information. Sophisticated 
voting predicts that ideological position may be positively or negatively related to voting Yes 
on the counter; interest and information should not be significant.
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Results are reported in Table 5. There is some evidence to support both naïve and 
sophisticated models. In 1988 and 2005, voting YY was clearly linked to lack of information. 
(No measure of voter information was available in 1990.) On the other hand, in 1990 and 
2005, voting YY was negatively correlated with our measure of the voter’s ideal point: in 
other words, among those who voted Yes on the original proposal, more centrist voters were 
more likely to vote Yes on the counter, as the sophisticated voting model predicts. 
(Table 5 about here.)
The simplest interpretation is that in the real world, some YY voters are unaware of the 
strategic situation, while others are deliberately choosing to support both measures against the 
status quo. Also, the numbers of each kind of voters varies in different elections. 
5 Heuristics for sophistication
As not all initiatives are defeated by counter-initiatives, even when they face determined and 
organized opposition, the naive model of voting cannot capture the whole truth about counter-
proposals. On the other hand, as pairs of competing proposals often do fail, it seems likely 
that counter-proposals do sometimes succeed in splitting the voters. The data support a mixed 
interpretation in which there are some of each kind of voters. This raises the question: what 
determines whether voters act naively or strategically? In the absence of cues from past 
performance, electoral history or party allegiance, one possible source of information is the 
campaigns themselves. For example, in the 2005 vote on competing healthcare initiatives, the 
website supporting Proposition 79 contained prominent pages attacking Proposition 78, while 
the ballot pamphlet’s supporters of Proposition 78 were also the opponents of Proposition 79, 
and advertisements were aired supporting 78 and simultaneously opposing 79. Thus, the two 
propositions were presented to voters by both sides as opposites. Both failed. I suggest that 
voters accepted the frame proposed by both sides in the campaign, in which initiatives were 
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seen as mutually opposed. Within this frame, voting YY made no sense: to support 79 was to 
be against 79, and vice versa.
By contrast, consider Propositions 5 and 6 in 1982. Both of these banned inheritance tax. 
Although technically competing initiatives, they do not fit my model, as backers of both 
propositions sincerely wanted to abolish inheritance taxes. (Perhaps ego rents explain the 
duplication of effort in running two campaigns.) Indeed, the propositions were substantively 
identical, and in the ballot pamphlet, backers of Proposition 5 urged voters to vote Yes on 6 as 
well. The naive voters modelled above would have voted for one or the other and could at 
best have coordinated on one proposal. In fact, both passed handily.
To test the theory that voters take cues from the oppositional or mutually supportive nature of 
the campaign, I examine the effect of having viewed television advertisements for 
Propositions 78 or 79 on vote choice. If the campaigns encouraged voters to view proposals 
as mutually exclusive and opposing, then voters who had seen campaign advertising on 
television would be more likely to vote either YN or NY, and less likely to vote YY, than 
those who had not. Figure 9 shows the simple bivariate relationship between vote and 
advertisement exposure. 
(Figure 9 about here.)
As expected, those who had seen the TV advertisement were more likely to vote either YN or 
NY. On the face of it, the TV ads (overwhelmingly funded by the pro-78/anti-79 camp) 
worked by converting YY voters into YN voters. A simple logit regression, with dependent 
variable “vote intention NY or YN”, and controlling for awareness of the proposition, 
knowledge about the backers of each proposition, and education levels shows the coefficient 
on exposure to the TV ads positive and significant as expected, (p-value=0.033; model 
Nagelkerke R2=.116). Coefficients for knowledge about the backers of each proposition and 
awareness of the proposition were also positive and significant. Although data limitations 
prevent a more in-depth investigation into the causes of naive voting, there is reason to 
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believe that at least in this case, the campaign polarized voters.
Supporters of the counter-proposal who seek to block all change have an incentive to polarize 
the campaign, but why do supporters of the original proposal fall into this trap? There are 
many possible reasons, though they are beyond the scope of the formal model. Being 
associated with a successful initiative may bring ego or reputational benefits. The initiative 
itself may reward its backers directly, perhaps by creating bureaucratic positions which they 
are likely to fill. Lastly, backers of the original proposal may be optimistic about its chances 
of winning and may therefore weigh the advantage of winning with their more radical 
proposal more highly compared to the benefit of getting at least some change if the counter-
proposal passes. 
6 Conclusion
Most direct democratic elections are straightforward: voters need only decide whether they 
prefer a proposed change to the status quo. Counter-proposals, on the other hand, offer a 
demanding test of voter sophistication. Voters must gauge their preferences over competing 
proposals without the usual cues of party affiliation, and without being able to infer the 
content of a proposal from the preferences of its backers. They must also coordinate with 
other voters to translate their preferences into outcomes, for example by taking advice on how 
to vote from the media or from independent organizations such as the National Organization 
of Women. Given the obstacles they face, it is not surprising that sometimes, voters fail to 
coordinate and conservative groups succeed in splitting their opponents. But as voters 
regularly pass initiatives against organized and well-funded opposition, they cannot always 
fail at this task. Indeed, my analysis finds that at least some voters make sophisticated tactical 
choices in votes on competing ballot measures. However, this sophistication is not achieved 
unaided. The nature of the campaign mediates vote choice and polarized campaigns can push 
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voters towards the naïve voting paradigm in which competing proposals are seen purely as 
rivals. Theoretically, this opens up the interesting question of how voter sophistication is 
enabled by political campaigning. Future work could develop models for this process. 
Practically, it should assuage the worry of Lacy and Niou (2000) that voters will be unable to 
cope when issues are linked. It also suggests that counter-proposals may not always deserve 
their bad press. They have the potential to confuse and divide voters. But if the circumstances 
are right, they can also offer reasonable compromises. Policy-makers should consider ways of 
explaining the voting situation better, to avoid manipulation by interest groups. For example, 
in California’s ballot pamphlets, the Legislative Analyst could explicity discuss groups of 
competing initiatives together and explain how votes translate into outcomes. 
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Appendix: formal proofs
The model
RG and CG are the radical and conservative group. The game proceeds as follows: RG 
decides whether or not to submit a proposal at P1 ∈ R (i.e. on the real number line). If RG 
makes a proposal, CG decides whether or not to submit a counter-proposal at P2 ∈ R. If there 
is a proposal, the voters vote. If there is one proposal the outcome is decided by majority rule, 
with P1 beating the status quo SQ = 0 if there is an even split. If there are two proposals, the 
outcome is SQ if neither gain 50% of the electorate, P1  (P2) if only P1 (P2) gets 50% or more 
votes, and whichever of P1 or P2 gets more votes if both get 50% or more. If both have equal 
majorities, P2 is the outcome. 
Call the outcome W ∈ R. Then utility for RG is URG = W. Similarly, CG's utility function is 
UCG = – W. (It would make no difference if CG had an ideal point lower than the status quo, 
or if RG had an ideal point above MV’.) For both groups, we ignore obviously dominated 
choices such as P1 < SQ or P2 > P1. We also assume that if either group cannot improve its 
utility by passing a proposal, it does not submit one.
Voters have ideal points distributed over the real line, which are common knowledge. Voter 
utility declines symmetrically and strictly from the voter’s ideal point. Thus for a voter with 
ideal point X and utility function U(.), |A-X| > |B-X| if and only if U(A) < U(B). For simplicity, 
we assume a continuous distribution of voter ideal points with a density function which is 
strictly positive at all points of the real line, i.e. there are some voters everywhere. (It would 
make no difference if the distribution was positive only at an interval strictly containing 
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[SQ,MV’].) Call N(a,b) the proportion of voters in the interval [a,b]. MV is the median voter 
ideal point: N(-∞, MV) = ½. We assume without loss of generality that MV > SQ = 0. MV' is 
the median voter’s indifference point to the status quo: MV'=2MV.
Individual voters are not players, as their choices are not strategic. Instead we model two 
separate assumptions. 
Naïve voters
In this case, for any voter V with ideal point X, V votes for Pi if and only if UV(Pi) ≥ UV(SQ) 
and UV(Pi) > UV(Pj), i ∈ {1,2}, j=3-i.
Proposition 1: if voters are naïve, no change from the status quo occurs when counter-
proposals are possible.
Proof: Suppose that P1 will pass if unopposed. Thus P1 ≤ MV'. (If P1 > MV', then the median 
voter, and a fortiori the half of the electorate to the left of MV, will be closer to SQ than P1; 
furthermore as there are voters with ideal points everywhere along the line, N(MV,(SQ+P1  
)/2) > 0 and these voters are also closer to SQ than P1, giving a strict majority in favour of 
SQ.)
Let MVS be the ideal point of the median voter in the subgroup of voters to the right of SQ, so 
that N(SQ,MVS) = N(MVS, ∞). Note that as N(-∞, SQ) > 0, MVS > MV, and as N(MV,MVS) > 
0, N(MVS, ∞) < N(MV, ∞) = ½. 
Suppose P1 = MVS. Then choose P2 = P1. If so, by our conditions for voting, neither 
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proposition gathers any votes. (Alternatively, if half the voters in (SQ,∞) were to vote for 
each proposition, then by our electoral rules both would fail. Even if voters could coordinate 
on a proposition in this case, a P2 arbitrarily close to P1 would ensure that both failed as 
N(P1+P2/2, ∞) → N(MVS, ∞) <  ½. )
Suppose P1 ≠ MVS. Choose P2 such that |P2 -MVS| = |P1 -MVS| and P2 ≠ P1. Either P2 > MVS > 
P1, in which case P2 > SQ, or P2 < MVS < P1. Then, as in the main text:  P1 ≤ MV' = MV + 
(MV – SQ) = 2MV – SQ; if P2<P1 , then P2 = MVS – (P1 – MVS) = 2MVS – P1; hence P2 ≥ 
2MVS – (2MV-SQ) = 2(MVS-MV) + SQ, and as MVS > MV, P2 > SQ.
Let PL be min(P1,P2) and PH be max(P1,P2). Only voters with ideal points in (MVS, ∞) vote for 
PH and as N(MVS, ∞) < ½, PH fails. Only voters in ((SQ+PL)/2, PL) vote for PL and as 
N((SQ+PL)/2,PL) < N(SQ,MVS) = N(MVS, ∞) < ½, PL also fails. Thus the outcome is SQ.
As any P1>SQ will result in a counter-proposal splitting the voters and ensuring SQ is the 
result, neither group submits a proposal and SQ remains in place. QED.
Sophisticated voters
In the case of sophisticated bloc voting, the four blocs of voters who share ordinal preferences 
over outcomes coordinate their votes as unitary actors. Let c=N(- ∞,(SQ+P2)/2), 
m=N((SQ+P2)/2,(SQ+P1)/2), p=N((SQ+P1)/2,(P1+P2)/2 ) and r=N((P1+P2)/2, ∞) denote 
the number of voters in each bloc.
Proposition 2: when voters are sophisticated and counter-proposals are possible, the 
outcome of a direct democratic campaign will be strictly closer to the median voter’s ideal  
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point than the status quo.
Proof: Each bloc has four strategies (YY, YN, NY and NN). This complicates the outcome 
space. We simplify as follows: first, if any bloc contains more than half of the electorate, it 
simply votes for its most preferred outcome. Second, voting for a proposition always makes it 
more likely to pass, and more likely to beat any other proposition. Therefore if a bloc's 
preferences over a proposition's passing are not dependent on the outcome of the vote on the 
other proposition, it always makes sense to vote accordingly. (Other strategies are weakly 
dominated.) In particular, moderates always vote NY. Other groups have the following non-
dominated strategy sets:
conservatives NY,NN
progressives YN,YY
radicals YN,YY
Finally, if m + p ≥ c + r, the outcome is P2: moderates will always vote NY, so progressives 
can achieve P2, their preferred outcome, by voting NY as well, regardless of other groups.
We are now left with 2 x 2 x 2 = 8 possible strategy profiles, and with a limited subset of 
population profiles such that any 3 groups will always beat the remaining group, and c+r > 
m+p. The three possible resulting games are shown separately in Table 1, with Nash 
equilibria shaded.
(Table 1 about here.)
The outcomes are fairly simple: P2 wins if the radicals on their own do not outweigh 
conservatives and moderates. If radicals outweigh conservatives and moderates (r > c+m), 
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then both P1 and P2 are Nash outcomes, but only P1 remains after iterated elimination of 
weakly dominated strategies. (Eliminate conservatives' NY, then progressives' NY and finally 
radicals' YN. No other order of elimination leads to a different outcome.) This prediction 
depends on conservatives preferring a strategy based on the potential outcome SQ, which 
never occurs in equilibrium. It is perhaps more realistic to view the different Nash equilibria 
as the result of different coalitions of voting blocs: a moderate-progressive coalition leads to 
P2 while a progressive-radical coalition leads to P1. Suppose P2 is the outcome when r>c+m. 
Then, as P2 will pass whenever radicals are less than a majority, any P1 > MV will be 
vulnerable to a successful counter-proposal P2=MV-(P1-MV)+ε<MV, while P1=MV will pass. 
Thus, RG will propose P1=MV  and the proposition holds. 
Suppose on the other hand that P1 is the result when r > c+m. By continuity of the distribution 
of voters, we have that c, m, p and r are continuous in the locations of P1 and P2 so long as 
SQ<P1<P2.
Suppose P1=MV’. Then, c+m=1/2. Thus, any P2>SQ will ensure r= N((P1+P2)/2, ∞)<N(MV, 
∞)=1/2, hence r<c+m so that P2 passes. Suppose P1=MV. Then, for any P2<P1, r r= 
N((P1+P2)/2, ∞)>N(MV, ∞)=1/2 and so P1 will pass. By continuity of c,m, p and r, there must 
be some largest P1∈(MV,MV’) such that no P2<P1 will pass.  Formally, define 
f(P2;P1)=max{c+m-r,m+p-c-r} for SQ<P2<P1 and f(SQ;P1)=lim x→SQ f(x;P1) and f(P1;P1)=lim 
x→P1 f(x;P1), these limits existing by continuity of f in (SQ,P1). Note that P2 is passable if and 
only if f(P2;P1)>0. Then f is continuous on the closed interval [SQ,P1] and attains a maximum 
thereon by Weierstrass. Let g(P1)=maxSQ≤P2≤P1 f(P2;P1). By Berge’s maximum theorem, g is 
also continuous. I showed above that g(MV)<0 and g(MV’)>0. Thus g(P1)=0 for some values 
of P1 strictly between MV and MV’. the set {P1:g(P1)=0} is closed by continuity of g and 
bounded, and therefore has a largest element. Call this element P1*. For any P1>P1*, there is 
some P2 such that f(P2;P1)>0; by continuity of f this can always be made to be a P2 strictly 
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between SQ and P1. 
To show that the radical group will choose P1*, we need to show that no P1> P1* will generate 
a counter-proposal P2> P1*. (By definition of P1* no P1> P1* will pass on its own.) CG will 
propose the leftmost counter-proposal that passes, if there is one. For any P1> P1*, suppose 
that this leftmost P2> P1*. But by definition of P1*, we have that for P1’= P1*+ε where ε >0, 
hence in particular P1’<P2, there is a P2’<P1’ with  f(P2’;P1’)>0. Furthermore, it is easy to see 
that f is weakly increasing in its P1 argument. Thus f(P2’;P1)>0 but as P2’<P1’<P2 this 
contradicts the claim that P2 is the leftmost passable counterproposal.
Thus in equilibrium the radical group chooses P1*∈ (MV,MV’) and this passes without 
generating a counter-initiative. This proves our claim as P1*  is closer to MV than SQ is. QED.
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Tables and figures
r > c+m r ≤ c+m ≤ p+r c+m > p+r
Con. Con. Con.
Prog. Rad. NY NN
NY YY P2 P2
Prog. Rad. NY NN
NY YY P2 P2
Prog. Rad. NY NN
NY YY P2 P2
YN P2 SQ
YY YY P2 P2
YN P2 SQ
YY YY P2 P2
YN P2 SQ
YY YY P2 P2
YN P1 P1 YN P2 P1 YN P2 SQ
Note: moderates always vote NY
Table 1: the voting game with blocs of sophisticated voters
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Both fail 8
Both pass 3
Original proposal only passes 4
Counter-proposal only passes 1
Table 2: Californian competing proposals, 1939-2007
Notes: where more than 2 competing proposals existed, this was only counted as one pair (all the 
counter-proposals always passed or failed together). Competing was defined by examining ballot  
pamphlets for clearly contradictory provisions and/or one proposal’s supporters being the other 
proposal’s opponents.
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Model/equilibrium Vote pattern
Naïve voting NN / NY / YN
Sophisticated voting Moderate coalition NN and NY / NY / YY and YN
r > c+m NN and NY / NY / YY
r ≤ c+m, radicals compromise NN and NY / NY / YY
r ≤ c+m, conservatives compromise NY / YY / YY and YN
Table 3: predicted voting patterns
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Election Proposal Sponsors Counter-
proposal
Sponsors Data 
Source
1988 
General
Proposition 
103
Ralph Nader, 
consumer 
groups
Proposition 
104
Auto insurers Field Poll 
88.7
1990 
General
Proposition 
140
Republicans Proposition 
131
John Van de 
Kamp
VRS Exit 
Poll
1996 
General
Proposition 
216
Ralph Nader, 
Harvey 
Rosenfield, 
nurses’ union
Proposition 
214
Doctors, 
nurses, SEIU
Field Poll 
96.6
2005 
Special
Proposition 
79
Consumer 
groups
Proposition 
78
Pharmaceutical 
companies
Field Poll 
05.4
Table 4: Competing proposals tested
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1988 
Propositions 
103 and 104
1990 
Propositions 
140 and 131
1996 
Propositions 
216 and 214
2005 
Propositions 79 
and 78
Intercept -0.06 (0.16) 0.36 (0.07)*** 0.95 (0.42) * 0.01 (0.35)
Predicted logged 
odds of Yes on 
original
0.16 (0.19) -0.55 (0.13) *** 0.75 (0.29) ** -0.71 (0.31) *
Voter 
information
-0.56 
(0.08)***
-- 0.19 (0.10) -2.18 (0.33) ***
AIC 475.25 1539.2 292.62 435.82
n 464 1176 216 353
Compatible with Naïve voting Sophisticated 
voting
Either Neither
Note: * significant at 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%. Weighted logits. “Voter information”: 1988 – 
total number of auto insurance propositions recognized; 1996 – total number of ballot 
propositions recognized; 2005 – was voter aware of backers of both propositions?
Table 5: Regressions of counter-proposal vote on voter ideal point and information level among Yes 
voters on original proposal
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Figure 1: Simple vote choice
41
Figure 2: Complex vote choice
42
Figure 3: splitting naive voters with a counter-proposal. Equal numbers of voters support P2 
and P1, so that neither proposal passes.
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Figure 4: sophisticated voter  blocs
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Figure 5: Voting patterns, Propositions 103 and 104, 1988
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Figure 6: Voting patterns, Propositions 140 and 131, 1990
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Figure 7: Voting patterns, Propositions 216 and 214, 1996
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Figure 8: voting patterns, Propositions 79 and 78, 2005
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Figure 9: Voting patterns by exposure to TV ads, 2005 Propositions 78/79
